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COMPONENT PARTS AND RAW MATERIALS SELLERS: 
FROM THE TITANIC TO THE NEW,RESTATEMENT 
by M Stuart Madden' 
ABSTRACT 
Professor Madden evaluates the treatment of potential design and 
informational obligation liability for raw materials and component parts 
manufacturers under the Products Liability Restatement. Following an 
introduction to the approach taken under the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts: Products Liability, and the congruent approach of the new the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (hereinafter Third 
Restatement), the author evaluates the Third Restatement and the limited 
number of decisions that have employed it. Further to the goal of 
evaluating the bona fides of the Third Restatement rule, the author 
describes the two principal approaches to modem Tort law. The first 
approach is the venerable corrective justice-morality model. The second 
model is that of economic efficiency-deterrence. Professor Madden 
concludes that the Third Restatement's synthesis in terms of warnings and 
design duties of raw materials or component parts suppliers proves up 
favorably under either construct, and that as respects these somewhat 
commingled issues represents a valuable contribution to Products Liability 
law. 
Copyright 1999, M. Stuart Madden 
1. Professor Madden is Charles A. Frueauff Research Professor and Distinguished 
Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, New York. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that the powers of Madison Avenue have at last 
persuaded you that you really would rather have a Buick. You buy one, 
and before the odometer registers 2000 miles, at a bend in the road and at a 
normal speed, the axle breaks. Your Buick stutters to a stop and you find 
yourselfas a stimulus for a multi-car chain collision. 
From your lap top modem at your hospital bed, you learn that the 
axle, part of Buick's original equipment, was manufactured not by General 
Motors, but by Acme Metal Works, a small but reputable manufacturer of 
axles for several automobile manufacturers. Your attorney, a graduate of 
the Salmon P. Chase School of Law, suggests that you bring a suit against 
Acme, since it appears that they manufactured an axle that was flawed in 
the manufacturing or inspection process, or was improperly designed. She 
suggests further that you sue Buick. You ask: "Why Buick?'The 
response is twofold. First, if the bank robber Willie Sutton had been a 
plaintiff's lawyer, he might say: "Because that's where the money is." 
Buick is solvent, and is not likely to repatriate to a foreign country during 
the pendency of the suit. Second, and in an insight that fills attorneys with 
a sense of deja vu, or more specifically a recollection of MacPherson v. 
Buick Motor Co.? you remember that if the overall product is marketed as 
a Buick, and if buyers have the reasonable perception that they are buying 
a Buick, then Buick has a nondelegableduty to sell a duly safe vehicle? 
In a new scenario, a middle-aged man has suffered bone damage 
to his jaw. His surgeon informs him that all or most of his condition can 
be eliminated by implantation of a temporomandibularjoint (TMJ), made 
of Teflon (TM). Teflon is a proprietary product of E.I. DuPont de 
NeMours. Such joints are manufactured by a company named Vitek. 
DuPont sells its product in bulk to a large number of purchasers, who use 
it for a multitude of purposes. While DuPont knows of many applications 
of its product, such as the popular cooking device coating, it neither knows 
of, nor does it take steps to inquire as to, the universe of Teflon's potential 
uses or misuses. 
DuPont does know that Teflon has not been approved as safe for 
application in Type I11 medical devices, and the literature accompanying 
2. 1 I I N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
3. See id at 1053. 
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its sale makes no representation as to its suitability for such use. When 
Teflon is found to be unsuitable for human implantation, should DuPont 
be liable in products liability?4 
A manufacturer sells truck chassis to which downstream 
assemblers will thereafter affix commercial truck bodies, ranging from 
beverage truck bodies to garbage truck bodies. Query: Is the component 
part manufacturer of the rear-view windows for such chassis charged with 
a duty to anticipate, and design for, rear vision mirrors suited to all 
potential uses?' 
A final hypothetical is based upon the venerable Cub Scout 
Pinewood Derby competition. The miniature pine cars, fashioned by Cub 
Scouts and their moms or dads, formerly were accompanied by miniature 
driver figurines, approximatelyLEG0 (TM)- sized. The assembly kit now 
announces that the driver figurines are no longer included. Perhaps the 
reason for the change is that the driver figurines posed a small parts 
hazard. Query: Would the driver figurine manufacturer have warnings or 
design duties regarding the inclusion of its otherwise non-defective 
stamped plastic figurines sold as a component part of a hobby kit 
principally manufactured by, and sold under the name of, the Pinewood 
Derby trademark? 
4. See M. Stuart~ Madden, Liability of Suppliers of Natural Raw Materials and the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability - A  First Step Toward Sound Public Policy, 
30 U .  Ma. L. REV. 281,305 (1997). 
5. According to Zma v. Marquess & Nell, Inc. 675 A.2d 620, 628 (N.J. 1996) (citations 
omitted): 
[Tlhe fabricator of a component part that is not inherently dangerous 
has no control over whether the purchaser properly installs the 
component part into the final system. Where a finished product is the 
result of work by more than one party, a court must examine at what 
stage installation of safety devices is feasible and practicable. In many 
jurisdictions, responsibility for installing a safety device is determined 
by reference to three criteria: (1) the trade custom indicating the party 
that normally would install the safety device; (2) the relative expertise 
of the parties, looking to which party is best acquainted with the design 
problems and safety techniques in question; and (3) practicality, 
focusing' on the stage at which installation of the device is most 
feasible. 
For a suggested answer, see Verge v. Ford Motor Co., 582 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1978), in 
which the court found not feasible the installation of safety devices by the competent 
manufacturer. 
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THE RESTATEMENT(SEC0ND) OF TORTS SECTION 402A 
TREATMENT OF COMPONENT PARTS AND RAW MATERIALS 
SELLERS' DUTIES 
A. Generally 
Component parts, raw materials and ingredients, and the 
responsibilities of sellers of such products, have long been treated as a 
special subcategory in products liability. The rationale has consistently 
been that component parts, raw materials, or ingredients enjoy one more, 
or all of these qualities that differentiate them from ordinary consumer 
products: 
(1) They often do not reach the final vendee or user in a form 
substantially unchanged and do not deserve strict products 
liability treatment under RE~~ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY (hereinafter Second Restatement) Section 
4 0 2 ~ ; ~  
(2) The upstream supplier may in fact have sold a duly safe and 
perfectly merchantable product that only thereafter, by dint of 
design, formulation, application, warnings or other initiatives 
taken by others, became a part of a defective end pr~duct ;~  
(3) The component part, raw materials or ingredient supplier 
often has no practical or efficient means of overseeing the use of 
its product by a large population of vendees, and thus cannot 
reasonably be expected to either foresee all potential hazards 
6. The court in Zaza held that 
[a] further requirement for the imposition of strict liability on a 
: component part fabricator is that the component part reach the user 
without substantial change. Where a component part is subject to 
further processing, or where the causing of the injury is not directly 
attributable to any defect in the component part, the fabricator is 
typically not subject to strict liability. 
675 A.2d at 629 (citations omitted). 
7. Commenting upon the implications of an alternative rule, the Third Restatement section 
5, comment (a) states in part: "[if] the component is not itself defective, it would be unjust 
and inefficient to impose liability solely on the ground that the manufacturer of the 
integrated product utilized the component in a manner that renders the integrated product 
defective." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCIS LIABILITY 5 5 cmt. a (1 998). 
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inhering in various finished products, nor take steps to remedy 
those flaws;' 
(4) With regard to raw materials and design duties at the least, 
absent adulteration or another production defect: there is no such 
thing as a misdesigned raw material, i.e., sand is sand, 
hydrochloric acid is hydrochloric acid;'' 
(5) Even without recourse against the component manufacturer, 
the injured party may proceed against the ultimate fabricator;" 
and 
(6) It is the downstream fabricator whom we want to encourage 
to pursue risk reducing manufacturing decisions," and who can 
most readily and inexpensively detect and remedy avoidable 
product risks." 
8. The Third Restatement explains that "[i]mposing liability would require the component 
seller to scrutinize another's product which the component seller has no role in developing. 
This would require the component seller to develop sufficient sophistication to review the 
decisions of a business entity that is already charged with responsibility for the integrated 
product." Id. 
9. One example occurred when sheet steel with an unacceptable level of internal 
imperfections was rendered brittle and unsuitable for fabrication into automobile radiator 
fan blades. See Pouncey v. Ford Motor Co., 464 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972). 
10. "Regarding the seller's exposure to liability for defective design, a basic raw material 
such as sand, gravel, or kerosene cannot be defectively designed. Inappropriate decisions 
regarding the use of such materials are not attributable to the supplier of the raw materials 
but rather to the fabricator who puts them to improper use." RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF 
TORTS: PRODUCTS L I A B I L ~  § 5 cmt. c (1998). 
11. Comment e to the Third Restatement notes that it is the final fabricator that makes the 
germane safety-related "decisions" regarding the final product, and it is that fabricator that is 
"the business entity that is already charged with responsibility for the integrated product." 
Id 8 5 cmt. a 
12. See id. 8 5 cmt. a 
13. Regarding raw materials integrated into other products, the Third Restatement explains 
that: 
The manufacturer of the integrated product has a significant 
comparative advantage regarding selection of materials to be used. 
Accordingly, raw-materials sellers are not subject to liability for harm 
caused by defective design of the end-product. The same 
considerations apply to failure-to-warn claims against sellers of raw 
materials. To impose a duty to warn would require the seller to 
develop expertise regarding a multitude of different end-products and 
to investigate the actual use of raw materials by manufacturers over 
whom the seller has no control. Courts uniformly refuse to impose 
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The American Law Institute's (hereinafter ALI) effort to 
accommodate this cluster of practical considerations is set out at section 5 
to the Third Restatement. Contemplating component parts, raw materials 
and product ingredients, that section provides: 
$ 5. Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor of 
Product Components for Harm Caused by Products Into 
Which Components Are Integrated 
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise 
distributing product components who sells or distributes a 
component is subject to liability for harm to persons or 
property caused by a product into which the component is 
integrated if 
(a) the component is defective in itself, as defined in this 
Chapter, and the defect causes the harm; or 
(b)(l) the seller or distributor of the component 
substantially participates in the integration of the 
component into the design of the product; and 
(2) the integration of the component causes the product 
to be defective, as defined in this Chapter; and 
(3) the defect in the product causes the harm.I4 
My goal in this essay is to examine both the premises of this new 
provision, and also to gauge preliminarily whether the Third Restatement 
section 5 conduces to identified tort objectives that have achieved greater 
or lesser following over the years. The doctrinal objectives that I have 
sketched out are these: 
1. Reduction in Avoidable Accident Costs 
Principal goals of accident law are the deterrence of harmful 
conduct and the encouragement of beneficial conduct. An accident law 
rule that provides in some measure both deterrence of risk-creating 
behavior and incentives for the actor to take affirmative steps to reduce 
such an onerous duty to warn. 
Id. $ 5 cmt. c. 
14. Id. $5.  
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avoidable accident advances these twin objectives. 
2. Cost Spreading 
A premise of accident law liability rules is that a seller will be 
able to liquidate a fairly predictable loss future into a dollar amount that it 
will pay for third-party liability insurance.'' The cost of such insurance, 
and other internal costs of liability defense, will therefore be spread among 
consumers of the subject product in the form of higher consumer prices.16 
An optimal liability rule will permit an insured to meet with its insurance 
carrier and describe with some particularity its potential future liability 
exposure. In contrast, an accident law rule that leaves a seller with 
indeterminate liability undermines the objective of cost spreading. 
3. Justice 
A general rule imposing joint liability upon component suppliers 
and final fabricators alike for the sale of defective finished products 
would, one acknowledges, achieve certain efficiencies in judicial 
administration. However, whatever the efficiency gains of such a rule, 
they would be dwarfed by various practical considerations. In this setting, 
a joint liability rule would be oblivious to tort considerationsofjustice. 
A tort rule that achieves the zenith of efficiency but which 
disregards justice or practical consequences will be rejected as irrational, 
otherwise wasteful, or, as the comments to the Second and Third 
Restatements suggest, both." Omnibus component or raw material seller 
liability would be unjust as it would impose an irrational burden upon 
sellers to superintend, which is to say, to be hall monitors, regarding 
myriad potential downstream applications of their otherwise non-defective 
products.18 Such a burden would, it is seen, impose social costs, in the 
form of elevated product costs, or even total unavailability of valuable 
15. See Steven W. Pottier & Robert C. Witt, On the Demand for Liability Insurance: An 
Insurance Economics Perspective, 72 TEX. L. REV. 168 1, 1684 (1 993). 
16. Should accident incidence or other factors make it infeasible to transfer insurance costs 
to consumers, or render insurance unavailable, the actor must necessarily evaluate the 
practicality of continuing the conduct, i.e., in the current context, the manufacture and sale 
of products. 
17. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY 4 5 (1 998). 
18. Id. 4 5 cmt. a. 
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products, that would occlude whatever deterrence attributes or 
administrativeefficiencies that might be achieved.I9 
4. Reasonable Foreseeability 
Within the shortest period of time, it now seems in retrospect, the 
so-called "strict liability" standard of the Second Restatement section 
402A was pulled back into the gravitational field of the reasonableness 
standards of negligence." Applying such a standard of reasonableness 
and reasonable foreseeability to a component seller's design and warning 
obligations does not, proponents of the Third Restatement rule might say, 
place a premium on ignorance." No modern accident law rules create 
incentives for ignorance. Rather, limitations on liability for component, 
raw materials and ingredient sellers simply and clearly recognize 
important distinctions between the component supplier's role and that of 
the final fabricator." A manufacturer remains responsible for being an 
expert in the field of the pertinent manufacturing endea~or.'~ A chair 
manufacturer is presumed to be an expert in the load strength and 
ergonomics of a duly safe chair, in both its intended use (sitting) and, at 
least with regard to load strength, a reasonably forseeable "off label" use 
such as to support a person attempting to replace a light bulb. 
Likewise, a seller of sand is held to the standard of an expert in the 
production of sand. We might suppose that such responsibility would run 
to such matters as making certain that your playground sand did not 
contain any dangerous level of adulteration, such as mineral radium or 
chrysotile asbestos. The sand seller is not expected to be an expert in the 
use of its product in the manufacture of glass since there are no 
identifiable perimeters around the potential end users of sand, or for that 
matter teflon, silicon, sheet metal or pig iron. Thus, a "reasonable 
19. See id. $ 2 cmt. a 
20. Consistent therewith, under the Third Restatement, only manufacturing defects are 
evaluated under a truly strict liability standard. Design and informational obligations are 
based upon reasonableness and foreseeability. Id. $ 1 cmt. a. 
21. See id. $ 1 cmt. a 
22. See id. 
23. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Inc., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1976); Olson v. 
Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Iowa 1994); Stahlheber v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 451 
S.W.2d 48, 61 (Mo. 1970). See also DAVID G.  OWEN ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND 
SAFETY 73 n.6 (3d ed. 1996). 
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foreseeability" predicate to the component seller's design or warning 
duties will, in the majority of circumstances, preclude a finding of 
liability.24 
B. Section 402A 's Strategic and Successfil Distortion of the 
Standards for a Conventional Restatement 
The objective of the Third Restatement, in keeping ALI~' 
tradition, is not to reform the law, but rather to rationalize it. It does so by 
reconciling to the extent possible conflicting state standards and creating a 
unified presentation of products liability law that might prompt a state 
high court in a jurisdiction that had not ruled on the matter to adopt the 
ThirdRestatement position as the optimal rule of law.26 
The Second Restatement section 402A, published in 1965, was 
more of a law reform initiative than a typical Restatement. Nevertheless, it 
became enormously influential because (a) at the time of its publication, 
Products Liability law was a substantially incoherent welter of divergent 
voices, a Tower of ~abe1;~'  and (b) section 402A gave language that 
courts could understand, at least initially. 
C. The Decisional Law Under Section 402A 
1. Generally 
Neither the Second Restatement section 402A nor its successor, 
Third Restatement, affect liability for the truly defective component part. 
24. A liability prerequisite of reasonable foreseeability is therefore essential (1) 
preservation of incentives for reasonable user caution; (2) for harmonization with riskfutility 
analysis employed elsewhere in personal injury law, and in products liability law 
particularly; (3) as the cornerstone for judicious identification of substandard conduct; (4) is 
central to optimal evaluation of economic efficiency; and (5) is necessary to any reasonable 
expectation that tort rules will encourage beneficial conduct and deter wasteful or harmful 
conduct. 
25. The American Law Institute is a private body of judges, practicing attorneys, and legal 
scholars that drafts and publishes the Restatements of various fields of the law. 
26. C/: AMERICAN LAW  INS^, THIS IS THE AMERICAN LAW INSITIUTE 1-4 (1996) 
(describing ALI's purpose, operations, and membership). 
27. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 461 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., 
concurring), 
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In comment p to the SecondRestatement section 402A, the ALI states: 
It seems reasonably clear that the mere fact that the 
product is to undergo processing, or other substantial 
change, will not in all cases relieve the seller of liability 
under the rule stated in this Section. If, for example, raw 
coffee beans are sold to a buyer who roasts and packs 
them for sale to the ultimate consumer, it cannot be 
supposed that the seller will be relieved of all liability 
when the raw beans are contaminated with arsenic, or 
some other poison . . . . On the other hand, the 
manufacturer of pigiron, which is capable of a wide 
variety of uses, is not so likely to be held to strict liability 
when it turns out to be unsuitable for the child's tricycle 
into which it is finally made by a remote buyer.28 
A harmonious note is added in the Third Restatement where the 
ALI confirms: 
[I]f a cut-off switch is sold in a defective condition due to 
loosely connected wiring, the seller of the switch is 
subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused 
by the improper wiring after the switch is integrated into 
another product. Similarly, if aluminum that departs from 
the aluminum manufacturer's specifications due to the 
presence of foreign particles is utilized in the manufacture 
of airplane engines, the seller of the defective aluminum 
is subject to liability for harm to persons to persons or 
property caused by the defects in the aluminum.29 
Putting aside circumstances in which the component, raw 
material, or ingredient is defective, under the Second Restatement section 
402A a component seller's warning duties extend only to such risks as 
were foreseeable at the time of the seller's initial introduction of the 
product into commerce.30 Where such risks are foreseeable, the decisions 
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY 8 402A (1965). 
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY 8 5 cmt. b (1998). 
30. Zaza, 675 A.2d at 632-33. The court stated: The general rule is that a manufacturer of 
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commend a manufacturer's duty in strict tort liability to provide warnings 
as to risks inhering in the use of its product as a component of another 
product only when the component supplier actually participated in the 
creation of the specificationsfor the end product, and in effect "signed off' 
on the suitability of its part or material for integration into such an end 
use?' Departures from this approach seem localized to circumstances in 
which even ordinary end use of the product could cause death or serious 
bodily injury, or where the component supplier, in contrast to its vendee, 
was in a clearly superior situation from which to evaluate and reduce the 
risk.32 
With the passage of years following the 1965 publication of the 
so-called "strict liability" rule of the Second Restatement section 402A, the 
section 402A design and warning duties, when compared to the duties that 
had been assigned under negligence principles, grew to be interpreted so 
similarly as to become nearly indistinguishable. One California court, 
relying upon the Second Restatement sections 388 and 394 described the 
standard for that state in these words: 
[Tlhe manufacturer has a duty to use reasonable care to 
give warning of the dangerous condition of the product or 
of facts which make it likely to be dangerous to those 
whom he should expect to use the product or be 
a coniponent part will not be held strictly liable for failure to warn where the danger 
involved is not foreseeable. See, e.g., Cropper v. Rego Distribution Center, Inc., 542 F. 
Supp. 1142, 1156 (D. Del. 1982) (holding that component part manufacturer was not liable 
for failing to place in its catalog warning of dangers involved in using component part in 
connection with unloading riser, on ground that manufacturer could not be expected to 
foresee every possible misuse to which part might be put); Maybeny v. Akron Rubber 
Machinery Corp., 483 F. Supp. 407, 413-14 (N.D. Okla. 1979) (holding that supplier of 
component parts which were not defective did not have duty to warn subsequent product 
manufacturer and employees of danger that might arise after components were assembled 
according to manufacturer's exclusive design). 
3 1. Cf: RESTATEMENT (m) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIAE~ILITY 5 cmt. a (1 998) (stating 
that the decisional law has not imposed liability upon component suppliers who did not 
participate in the integration of the component into the design of the final product). 
32. E.g., Stuckey v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 874 F.2d 1563, 1568 (1 lth Cir. 1989) 
(finding that a propane gas supplier had a duty to warn that its product's odorant could 
fade); Andrulonis v. U.S., 924 F.2d 1210, 1223 (2d Cir. 1991) (held: government liable for 
failure to provide adequate warnings of the risks of particular uses of rabies strain for 
research use). See Arena v. Owens Coming, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
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endangered by its probable use, if the manufacturer has 
reason to believe that they will not realize its dangerous 
condition.33 
Accordingly, decisional law under both the negligent failure to 
warn and the strict liability failure to warn approaches of the Second 
Restatement has confirmed repeatedly that component and raw materials 
sellers of merchantable products should not, as a general proposition, be 
exposed to warning duties. Considerations of both fairness and financial 
burden have figured conspicuously in such conclusions. As one court 
stated: 
Making suppliers of inherently safe raw materials and 
component parts pay for the mistakes of the finished 
product manufacturerwould not only be unfair, but it also 
would impose an intolerable burden on the business world 
. . . . Suppliers of versatile materials like chains, valves, 
sand, gravel, etc., cannot be expected to become experts 
in the infinite number of finished products that might 
conceivably incorporate their multi-use raw materials or 
 component^.^^ 
Like considerationsguided a widely referenced 1980 decision of a 
Pennsylvania federal trial court, Orion Ins. Co. v. United Technologies 
Corp.," which involved a manufacturer who built a component part to 
spe~ification.~~ Absent a defect in the part, and upon a showing that it was 
reasonable for the component manufacturer to rely upon said 
specifications, the Orion court concluded: 
w]o public policy can be served by imposing a civil 
penalty on a manufacturer of specialized parts for a highly 
33. Putensen v. Clay Adams, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 319,328 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970)(quoting the 
Second Restatement $8 388,394). Putensen involved the manufacture of tubing and its sale 
to hospitals. Id. at 323. Among the tubings' uses was catheterization. Id. 
34. In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implant Recipients v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours 
& Co., 97 F.3d 1050, 1057 (8th Cir. 1996). 
35.502 F. Supp. 173 (E.D. Pa 1980). 
36. Id. at 174. 
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technical machine according to the specifications supplied 
by one who is expert at assembling these technical 
machines, who does so without questioning the plans or 
warning of the ultimate user. The effect of such a 
decision on component parts manufacturers would be 
enormous. They would be forced to retain private experts 
to review an assembler's plans and to evaluate the 
soundness of the proposed use of the manufa~threr's~arts. 
The added cost of such a procedure both financially and 
in terms of stifled innovation outweighs the public benefit 
of giving plaintiffs an additional pocket to look to for 
recovery. I believe the better view is to leave the liability 
for design defects where it belongs and where it now 
is-with the originator and implementer of the design-the 
assembler of the finished pr~duct.~' 
In reasoning similar to that of courts evaluating claims against 
sellers of component parts, harmonious conclusions have been reached 
consistently in claims brought against sellers of raw materials. For 
example, a seller's incapacity to anticipate, and therefore to affect end use 
risks, provided the basis for defendant's judgment in Pennwalt Corp. v. 
Superior ~our t .~ '  That suit arose from injuries an eighteen year old 
plaintiff suffered while attempting to compound chemicals, including 
sodium chlorate, aluminum powder, and sulfur:9 at home to create 
fireworks. Plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer, distributor, and 
retailer of each chemical.40 The appellate court held that the manufacturer 
of the chemicals should not be liable to plaintiff for the sale of a chemical 
that had been repackaged, relabeled, and distributed through a retailer over 
which the manufacturer had no control.'" The court explained: 
Sodium chlorate has many legitimate uses, some of which 
involve using it in conjunction with other chemicals. 
Pennwalt cannot be expected to anticipate every possible 
37. Id. at 178. 
38.218 Cal. Rptr. 675 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 677. 
41. Id. 
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use and issue warnings of any potential danger involved 
in each such use. To hold otherwise would place an 
impossible burden on a bulk manufacturer which would 
be tantamount to imposing absolute liability for injury 
resulting from the use of a product not claimed to be 
otherwise defe~tive."~ 
Another California case, Walker v. Staufler Chemical C ~ r p . ? ~  
involved a plaintiff who was injured seriously by an explosion of drain 
cleaner that contained sulfuric acid.44 With respect to the mismarketing 
claim brought against the supplier of the sulfuric acid, the court observed: 
"We are referred to no California case, nor has independent research 
revealed any such, extending the strict liability of the manufacturer (seller) 
to the supplier of a substance to be used in compounding or formulating 
the product which eventually causes injury to an ultimate con~umer."~' 
The Walker court explained further: 
We see no compelling reason for an extension [of strict 
liability] to a situation such as presented in the instant 
case . . . . We do not believe it realistically feasible or 
necessary to the protection of the public to require the 
manufacturer and supplier of a standard chemical 
ingredient . . . not having control over the subsequent 
compounding, packaging or marketing of an item 
. ,eventually causing injury to the ultimate consumer, to 
bear the responsibility for that injury. The manufacturer 
(seller) of the product causing the injury is so situated as 
to afford the necessary pr~tection.~~ 
Read together, Pennwalt, Orion, Walker and Staufler invite the 
conclusion that under comment p to the Second Restatement section 402A, 
no liability should attach to the seller of component parts, raw materials or 
ingredients having multiple end uses, the selection of which is beyond the 
42. Id. 
43.96 Cal. Rptr. 803 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 805-06. 
46. Id. at 806. 
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seller's control. 
THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT TREATMENT OF 
COMPONENT PART SUPPLIER AND RAW MATERIAL SELLERS' 
DUTIES 
A. Generally 
Commentary to section 2 (c) of the Third Restatement makes plain 
the ALI's conclusion, subject to an exception for the supplier who is 
substantially involved in the design of the eventual product, that absent a 
defect in the component, the raw material, or the ingredient, liability 
should not attach to component sellers whose product is integrated into a 
defective end product.47 Comment a thereto states: 
As a general rule, component sellers should not be liable 
when the component itself is not defective as defined in 
this Chapter. If the component is not itself defective, it 
would be unjust and .inefficient to impose liability solely 
on the ground that the manufacturer of the integrated 
product utilizes the component in a manner that renders 
the integrated product defective. Imposing liability would 
require the component seller 40 scrutinize another's 
product which the component seller has no role in 
developing. This would require the component seller to 
develop sufficient sophistication to review the decisions 
of the business entity that is already charged with 
responsibility for the integrated product.48 
The Third Restatement provides further support and illustration, stating: 
"[A] basic raw material such as sand, gravel, or kerosene cannot be 
defectively designed . . . . Accordingly, raw-materials sellers are not 
subject to liability for harm caused by defective design of the 
end-product."49 
Should an employee of the downstream manufacturer or fabricator 
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY 5 2(c) (1  998). 
48. Id. 5 2 cmt. a. 
49. Id. 5 5 cmt. c. 
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be put at an unreasonable risk by virtue of a misapplication of the 
component vendor's product, guidance as to the vendor's warnings 
obligations is found in the more general warnings provisions of the Third 
Restatement. Regarding sales to informed intermediaries under the Third 
Restatement, the conventional rule regarding a seller's informational 
obligation to the ultimate user is stated as follows: 
There is no general rule as to whether one supplying a 
product for the use of others through an intermediary has 
a duty to warn the ultimate product user directly or may 
rely on the intermediary to relay warnings. The standard 
is one of reasonableness in the circumstances. Among the 
factors to be considered are the gravity of the risks posed 
by the product, the likelihood that the intermediary will 
convey the information to the ultimate user, and the 
feasibility and effectiveness of giving a warning directly 
to the user.50 
B. The Early Decisional Response 
Because of the yet novel quality reality of the Third Restatement, 
it would not be realistic to expect a groundswell of judicial reaction, be it 
favorable or unfavorable. Nevertheless, the early decisions seem to 
suggest that courts find both the articulation and the application of the new 
rule appealing. 
One example is a New Jersey Supreme Court case that involved 
injuries sustained by one Gerardo Zaza, an employee of Maxwell House 
Coffee (Maxwell House), a division of General Foods." Upon 
discovering a clog in a quench tank, Zaza was burned severely by 
scalding hot liquids while attempting to repair the malfuncti~n.'~ The 
defendant had bid to build the quench tank to the specifications of the 
buyer, and these specifications did not require any of the safety devices 
that might have prevented the injury.s3 Instead, the specifications merely 
50. Id. 8 2(c) cmt. i.  
5 1.  Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc., 675 A.2d 620,624 (N.J .  1996). 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
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required defendant to cut holes for any such safety devices.54 
~evi'ewing the trial court's grant of summary judgment, SS the New 
Jersey Supreme Court quoted, with approval, an earlier draft of comment a 
to the Third Restatement referenced above. Affirming the judgment below, 
the state high court wrote: 
The majority of courts from other jurisdictions have held 
that a manufacturer of a component part, which is not 
dangerous until it is integrated by the owner into a larger 
system, cannot be held strictly liable to an injured 
employee for the failure of the owner and/or assembler to 
install safety devices, so long as the specifications 
provided are not so obviously dangerous that it would be 
unreasonable to follow them.56 
The court in Zaza explained: 
Holding defendant liable would impose on a component 
part fabricator, whose products were built in accordance 
with the designer's specifications and whose part when it 
left defendant's plant was not defective, the duty to 
investigate whether the use of its non-defective product 
'would be made dangerous by the integration of that 
product into the complex system designed and installed 
54. Id. 
55. The trial court stated: 
The plaintiff says the defendant failed to provide warnings. There was 
no way that the fabricator could even know what the final looks of that 
machine would be or what type of use the machine would entail or 
what component parts would be added to that tank in order to make it 
into a manufacturing instrument, into an operative working unit. 
Id. at 626. 
56. Id at630. see also Orion Ins. Co. v. United Tech. Corp. 502 F. Supp. 173, 178 (E.D. 
Pa  1980); Maybeny v. Akron Rubber Mach. Corp., 483 F. Supp. 407,413 (N.D. Okla 
1979) (holding that "where a supplier fiunishes a component part free of defects and 
without knowledge of the design of the end product, strict liability should not be imposed 
on the supplier for injury resulting from the end product design"); Woods v. Graham Eng'g 
Corp., 539 N.E.2d 316,318-19 (111. App. 2d 1989) (holding that component manufacturer 
liable only when responsible for final design of product or component part itself caused 
injury). 
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by experts. Component fabricators would become 
insurers for the mistakes and failures of the owners and 
installers to follow their own plans. Defendant would 
have to retain an expert to determine whether each and 
every integrated manufacturing system that incorporates 
one of its sheet metal products is reasonably safe for its 
intended use . . . . Even if defendant wanted to provide a 
warning, there is no suitable location on the quench tank 
for a warning. The quench tank is not a single unit 
designed to come into contact with workers. Moreover, 
plaintiffdid not produce any evidence that the tank was so 
obviously dangerous that International had an obligation 
to warn the users of the trecar-carbon regeneration 
system. Maxwell House's plans called for the installation 
of safety devices, and professionals were hired to ensure 
that the plans were followed . . . . The duty to warn does 
not extend to the speculative anticipation of how 
component parts that are not defective can become 
potentially dangerous, depending on the nature of their 
integration into a complex system designed and 
assembled by an~ther.~' 
Another recent obeisance to the Third Restatement component 
seller rule is Artiglio v. General Electric Co. a silicon breast implant suit 
before a California Appeals Court, in which appellant appealed a summary 
judgment.59 The underlying claim was that the silicon supplier breached a 
duty to warn customers about the claimed potential hazards of silicon in 
these medical devices.60 The facts showed that General Electric (GE), the 
manufacturer of the silicon, supplied it in fifty-five gallon drums to 
McGhan Medical Corp., which manufactured the  implant^.^' On appeal, 
GE argued the rectitude of the verdict, stating that: 
[Blecause it supplied silicone materials which are used in 
57. Id. at 634-35. 
58.71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 8 17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
59. Id. at 818. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
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a number of other products, because the silicone materials 
it provided were subject to further processing by the 
actual manufacturers of breast implants and because the 
implant manufacturers themselves had the ability to 
determine the suitability and safety of the implants, it 
owed no duty of care to the eventual recipients of the 
silicone breast implants.62 
After' turning to what may eventually become an obligatory 
reference to the Third Restatement section 5 comment c, the appellate 
court continued by relying upon comment b, which addresses 
"sophisticated buyers" and states: 
[Wlhen a sophisticated buyer integrates a component into 
another product, the component seller owes no duty to 
warn either the immediate buyer or ultimate consumers of 
dangers arising because the component is unsuited for the 
special purpose to which the buyer puts it. To impose a 
duty to warn in such a circumstance would require that 
component sellers monitor the development of products 
and systems into which their components are to be 
integrated.63 
Affirming the court below, the appellate division summarized: 
Taken together, [authority establishes] that component 
and raw material suppliers are not liable to ultimate 
consumers when the goods or material they supply are not 
inherently dangerous, they sell goods or material in bulk 
to a sophisticated buyer, the material is substantially 
changed during the manufacturing process and the 
supplier has a limited role in developing and designing 
62. Id. GE's chemical "building block" for the manufacture of silicon was 
polydimethylsiloxane (PDMS). Id. GE used PDMS manufacturing "a host of silicone 
materials for use by the manufacturers of everything from bed pads to electronic circuit 
boards to food additives to other medical devices." Id. 
63. Id. at 822 (The Proposed Final Draft of the Restatement Third of Torts, Products 
Liability, 8 5, approved on May 20, 1997). 
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the end product. When these factors exist, the social cost 
of imposing a duty to the ultimate consumers far exceeds 
any additional protection provided to consumers.64 
THE TORT GOALS OF CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND EFFICIENCY 
A. Generally 
One court wrote recently: "Products liability law is based on 
concepts of fairness, feasibility, practicality and functional responsibility. 
[Courts] have always stressed the public's interest in motivating 
individuals and commercial enterprises to invest in safety. . . ."65 
\ 
In the above review of the liability rules and the decisional law 
thereunder, the courts, the ALI authors of the comments to the Second 
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A, and the Third Restatement 
frequently invoke expressions such as "just," or "unjust," or "efficient," or 
"social cost." These terms have broadly understood common colloquial 
meanings, so that an "inefficient" tort rule is interpretedas one that wastes 
money. I would like now to think in terms of economic efficiency- 
deterrence, and corrective justice-morality, in a more particularized way. 
There are today two contrasting schools of tort phi l~sophy.~~ The
older of the two approaches is commonly termed corrective justice, and its 
influential group of scholars hew to the position that the original and 
64. Id. See also In re TMJ Implants Products Liability Litigation, 97 F.3d 1050, 1057 (8th 
Cir. 1996). 
65. Zaza v. Marquess & Nell Inc., 675 A.2d 620,636 (N.J. 1996). 
66. Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Aflrming Both Deterrence and 
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997). Mr. Schwartz stated that: "currently there 
are two major camps of tort scholars. One understands tort liability as an instrument aimed 
largely at the goal of deterrence, commonly explained within the framework of economics. 
The other looks at tort law as a way of achieving corrective justice between the parties." Id. 
See generally John Borgo, Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J .  LEGAL STUD. 419,454-55 
(1979) (commending "conception of tort law that rivals the dominant economic one," 
employing "notions of individual moral responsibility . . . logically excluded from the 
latter"); Matthew S. O'Comel, Correcting Corrective Justice: Unscrambling the Mixed 
Conception of Tort Law, 85 GEO. L.J. 1717 (1997). The article stated that generally 
accepted theories of tort law can be divided into two classes: instrumental theories, which 
view social cost and efficiency as the essential factors in evaluating rights and duties under 
the law, and noninstrumental theories, which view law as the vindication of a scheme of 
moral responsibility. Id. 
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primary goal of tort law, including the law of products liability, is righting 
wrongs caused by tortious behavior.67 With its strong overlay of moral 
obligation, and the annulment of a wrongdoer's unjust enrichment, the 
corrective justice approach posits that tort's principal raison d72tre is to 
return parties suffering personal physical injury or property damage due to 
another's tortious conduct to the status quo ante,, at least insofar as money 
damages can so do.68 The more recently developed approach is one of 
economic efficiency, an evaluation that seeks to demonstrate that the 
appropriate measure of the success, or failure, of tort law ought to proceed 
under an economic analysis,6' emphasizing evaluation of such 
considerations as wealth maximization, avoidance of waste, and 
o~erdeterrence.'~ 
B. Corrective Justice-Morality 
As a corollary to the corrective justice rectificatory goal of setting 
matters straight between the parties, the correctivejustice model sets forth 
the broader societal objective of reducing the occurrence of similar wrongs 
in the future. The corrective justice objective of deterrence is evidenced in 
such early writings as that of one academic author, who in 1890 wrote of 
the goals of the negligence action in these words: "The really important 
matter is to adjust the dispute between the parties by a rule of conduct 
which shall do justice if possible in the particular case, but which shall 
also be suitable to the needs of the community, and tend to prevent like 
accidents from happening in the f~ture."~'  The Supreme Court, in 
67. See JULES L. C O W ,  RISKS AND WRONGS 197 (1992). 
68. See id (noting that one of two ways of "understanding tort law ... emphasizes its role in 
rectifying for wrong done"). 
69. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Eflciency 
Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980) (discussing efficiency 
norm and wealth maximization); Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of 
Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377,381 (1994). 
70. See id. 
71. William Schofield, Davies v. Mann: Theory of Contributory Negligence, 3 HARV. L. 
REV. 263, 269 (1890); accord Barrett v. Superior Court (Paul Hubbs Constr. Corp.), 272 
Cal. Rptr. 304 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (interpreting term "wrongful act" in wrongful death 
statute to mean tortious act). The Barrett court commented further that by choosing not to 
limit the measure of damages, "California has chosen to strengthen the deterrent aspect of 
the civil sanction: "the sting of unlimited recovery . . . more effectively penalize [s] the 
culpable defendant and deter[s] it and others similarly situated from such future conduct"' . . 
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Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 72 implicitly recognized the deterrence role of 
an award of tort damages, i.e., that a tort judgment equates to a 
"requirement or prohibition" in that such tort judgments force actors to 
make behavioral modifications upon pain of paying large money awards.73 
Corrective justice principles in tort are intended to minimize not 
only the personal physical injury effect of accidents, but also to lessen the 
intrusions such accidents work upon others' autonomy and liberty 
interests. Personal autonomy is stated repeatedly to be part of that bundle 
of modern citizenship rights, the perimeters of which law should 
mediate.74 A dictionary defines "autonomy" as "independence or 
freed~m."~' If the correlative right of "liberty," which has been defined as 
"freedom from external control or interference, obligations, etc.; freedom 
to is added to freedom, then the freedom to choose and the 
informed choice rationale of a seller's warnings obligations are 
inextricably related. 
Economic analysis of tort law is not limited to one analytical 
construct. More than one vantage point from which an economic 
observation of products liability rules may be made. The "utilitarian 
theory" invites the assessment of the relative social cost associated with 
favoring one course of conduct over another. Coase, with his example of 
the physician and the c~nfectioner,'~ prompts application of utilitarian 
. rather than to protect defendants from excessive financial burdens." Id. at 308'(citations 
omitted). See also Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 283, 291 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1985) (stating one principal purpose of strict liability was to provide an economic incentive 
for improved product safety). 
72.505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
73. Id. at 536 (Blackrnun , J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
74. E.g., General Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d 353, 363 (Tex. 1993) (Doggett, J., 
dissenting). Justice Doggett stated that "[tlhe requirement that manufacturers provide 
adequate warnings serves the dual goals of 'risk reduction and the protection of individual 
autonomy in decision-making."' Id. (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 4 96, at 685 (5th ed. 1984)). 
75. THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 92 (rev. ed. 1975). 
76. Id. at 772. 
77. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 13 (1960) (stating 
that in a setting where confectioner's operation causes disturbance to physician's practice, 
appropriate question is not who should compensate physician in nuisance, but rather 
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theory to the products liability context, in which the question might be 
posed this way: To what extent is it worthwhile to restrict or encumber 
product availability in order to achieve marginally safer products, or, 
considering social cost, is it preferable to ensure a broader range of 
products, conceding that more products with marginally higher potential. 
for harm will exist in the market? Thus, a utilitarian or social cost model 
measures a tort rule's practical effect o'n plaintiffs and defendants as a 
whole, and considers how much social and economic cost we are prepared 
to incur in order to maintain product availability. 
Another perspective that has played an ascendant role in modern 
economic analysis of tort law involves the concepts of "wealth 
maximization'' and "efficiency," and the relationship between them. 
Michael D. Green describes the "wealth maximizationM--"economic 
efficiency" relationship in these terms: "By economic efficiency [is meant] 
maximizing total societal resources, without concern for the distribution of 
those resources among members of so~iety."'~ One of the efficiency 
school's most noteworthy constructs' has been to "emphasize [tort law's] 
role in substituting for efficient contractual e~change."'~ To Posner, apart 
from the corrective justice, moral and fairness attributes of tort liability, 
the law and economics argument is that any intentional tort or accident 
law doctrine should "dete[r] persons from engaging in activities that a 
reasonable person would view ahead of time to be socially wasteful."80 
In Posner's words, such torts, i.e., unconsented to harmful acts, 
"involve . . . a coerced transfer of wealth to the defendant occurring in a 
settjng of low transaction costs. Such conduct is inefficient because it 
violates the principle . . . that where market transaction costs are low, 
people should be required to use the market if they can and to desist from 
the conduct if they can't. '' Posner concludes that such bypassing of the 
market is inefficient and therefore should create liability in tort.82 
whether social costs and gains are best sewed by preservation of status quo, by cessation of 
confectionefs activities, or by cessation of physician's activities). 
78. Michael D. Green, Negligence = Economic Eflciency: Doubts, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1605, 
1607 n.12 (1997) (citing Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Judicial Decision- 
Making, 4 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 13 1,  132 (1984)). 
79. COLEMAN, supra note 67 at 197. 
80. J w  A. HENDERSON, JR. FT AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 29-30 (4th ed. '1 994) (discussing 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 206-1 1 (4th ed. 1992)). 
8 1 .  RI- A. POS- ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 'IHE LAW 208 (4 th ed. 1992). 
82. Id. at 207-09. 
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Transferred to a products liability context, what of the seller of a defective 
product that causes personal physical injury or property damage? 
Economists might recast the corrective justice goals of 
encouraging individual autonomy and liberty to efficiency-based 
objectives phrased in terms of discouraging involuntary transfers of 
wealth, market avoidanceYg3 or imposition of negative externalities. A 
- 
product purchaser has a societally-countenanced expectation, the argument 
goes, that the product will not create an unreasonable risk of harm if used 
for its reasonably foreseeable purpose.84 Should the product prove 
dangerously defective, and should the purchaser be injured or his property 
damaged, the manufacturer has, in a sense, subverted the market and 
created accident costsSS that might have been avoided had the 
83. See Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 
97 YALE L.J. 353, 355 (1988) (supposing consumer sovereignty as dominant objective in 
transactions between contracting parties, under which norm: "the law should reflect the 
preferences of competent, informed consumers regarding risk allocation.") See also 
Kathryn Dix Sowle, Toward a Synthesis ofproduct Liability Principles: Schwartz's Model 
and the Cost-Minimization Alternative, 46 U .  MIAMI L. REV. 1 , 9  (1991). Werner Z. Hirsch 
has observed that: "broadly speaking, a tort is a civil (seldom a criminal) wrong. Such a 
wrong occurs when one party, usually unintentionally, destroys another party's initial 
entitlement by imposing a negative externality on him. The courts can then provide a 
remedy in the form of damages. When externalities result in the forcible taking of initial 
entitlements--for example, when a slaughterhouse pollutes the air of the surrounding 
neighborhood--liability rules can be invoked. Concomitantly government assumes 
responsibility for the imposition of objectively determined compensation and its prompt 
payment to the party harmed." WERNER Z. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN 
INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 127 (1 979). 
84. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY 2 cmt. a (1998) 
(Reporters' Note). The comment states that "[Sltrict liability has been justified on fairness 
grounds because the product containing a hidden manufacturing defect that causes harm 
disappoints the consumer's or user's reasonable expectations with regard to safety." (citing, 
inter alia, F. Patrick Hubbard, Reasonable Human Expectations: A Normative Model for 
Imposing Strict Liability for Defective Products, 29 L. REV. 465 (1978); Marshall 
S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Comumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and 
Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1 109 (1974)). 
85. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND E C O N O ~  ANALYSIS 
129 (1970) (discussing loss spreading, general deterrence, and specific deterrence 
approaches to accident cost reduction). Stephen Sugarman has summarized Calabresi's 
cost-avoidance philosophy: 
In [The Costs of Accidents], Calabresi argued that society's policy 
towards accidents should be to minimize the sum of primary, 
secondary, and tertiary accident costs. Reducing primary costs concerns 
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manufacturer simply bargained for pertinent product-related rights. 
Perhaps the best substitute for an actual bargained for exchange is 
a circumstance in which a buyer, fully apprised of pertinent safety-related 
information and instructions for the safe operation of a product, makes an 
informed decision to purchase the product for the buyer's use or for 
devotion to the use of others. Such a knowledgeable consent or choice 
model for sale of a product with a high risk level means, in a 
proto-contractual sense, that the seller has bargained for the right to sell it. 
In essence, the seller preserves the transaction within the market by 
conveying warnings sufficient to permit the purchasers to make informed 
choices of whether or not to expose themselves to the risk. Absent a 
bargain struck with an informed purchaser, the sale of a product defective 
for want of adequate warnings, and that proximately causes plaintiffs 
harm, represents an involuntary or coerced transfer of wealth from the 
injured party to the injurer. 
A primitive but persuasive evaluative standard was offered in a 
negligence context by Judge Learned Hand in the opinions in United 
States v. Carroll Towing CO.,'~ and Conway v. O'Brien." In those two 
cases, the Second Circuit held that the degree of care appropriate to a 
given action or omission to act should be the result of a three-factor 
promoting safety (while not discouraging, if possible, socially desirable 
innovation). Reducing secondary costs concerns spreading the costs of 
compensation paid to accident victims. Tertiary costs are the 
transactions costs; these costs include the costs of lawyers' fees, 
insurance administration, the parties' time, and court costs. 
Stephen D. Sugarman, A Restatement of Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1167 (1992) 
(review essay). Jules Coleman hrther explains the three types of costs attributable to 
personal injury or property damage torts: 
Primary costs are the dollar equivalent of the damages caused by 
accidents. Secondary costs are the costs of bearing the costs of 
accidents. These are the costs associated with the various schemes for 
distributing the primary (and tertiary) costs of accidents. Secondary 
costs are reduced when they are spread maximally over persons and 
time, or when they are borne by those individuals in the best position to 
bear them. Tertiary costs are the ndministrative costs of any system, 
including the tort system, for determining who should bear the costs of 
accidents. 
COLEMAN, supra note 67 at 204. 
86. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
87. 11 1 F.2d 61 1,612 (2d Cir. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 3 12 U.S. 492 (1941). 
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calculus: (1) the likelihood that the conduct will injure others; (2) 
multiplied by the seriousnessof the risk if it happens; (3) balanced against 
the burden of taking precautions against the risk." In formula, the 
calculation is known as B (Burden) < P (Probability of Harm) X L 
(Magnitude of Loss Should It Occur).89 The Learned Hand approach can 
be conformed to a more modem utilitarian analysis by visualizing B, or 
the Burden upon the actor, as encompassing not only the particular burden 
of precautionarymeasures upon the actor, but also the burden upon society 
if the conduct must either be eliminated due to liability rules, or made 
more expensive if the precautionarymeasures are ~ndertaken.~ 
Posner machined the Hand formulation into an efficiency . . . 
principle by explaining that: 
Hand was adumbrating, perhaps unwittingly, an economic 
meaning of negligence. Discounting (multiplying) the 
cost of an accident if it occurs by the probability of 
occurrence yields a measure of the economic benefit to be 
anticipated from incurring the costs necessary to prevent 
the accident . . . . If the cost of safety measures [including, 
perhaps, 'eliminating the activity'] or of 
curtailment--whichever cost is lower--exceeds the benefit 
in accident avoidance to be gained by incurring that cost, 
society would be better off, in economic terms, to forgo 
accident pre~ention.~' 
88. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173; Conway 11 1 F.2d at 612. 
89. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173. 
90. Likewise, in keeping with a utilitarian economic view that transcends the concerns of 
the individual plaintiff and defendant, consideration of the factors P (Probability of Harm) 
and the L (Magnitude of the Loss should it occur) would be enlarged to contemplate the 
likelihood of harm to others identically or similarly situated, and the magnitude of the 
potential harm, not only in terms of the individual plaintiff but also to the population 
exposed to the risk. 
91. Richard A. Posner, A Theory ofNegligence, 1 J .  LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972). Posner 
continues: 
When the cost of accidents is less than the cost of prevention, a rational 
profit-maximizing enterprise will pay tort judgments . . . rather than 
incur the larger cost of avoiding liability. Furthermore, overall 
economic value or welfare would be diminished rather than increased 
by incurring a higher accident-prevention cost in order to avoid a lower 
accident cost . . . . Perhaps, then, the dominant function of the fault 
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1. Least Cost Avoider 
A leading exponent of the efficiency role of the common law of 
tort has been Guido Calabresi, who has argued persuasively that in matters 
of compensation for accidents, civil liability should ordinarily be laid at 
the door of the "cheapest cost avoider," the actor who could most easily 
discover and inexpensively remediate the hazard.92 Together with A. 
Douglas Melamed, and employing the setting of environmental harm, 
Calabresi asserts that considerations of economic efficiency dictate 
placing the costs of accidents "on the party or activity which can most 
cheaply avoid them."93 Posner's harmonious observation has been that in 
system is to generate rules of liability that if followed will bring about, 
at least approximately, the efficient--the cost-justified--level of 
accidents and safety . . . . Because we do not like to see resources 
squandered, a judgment of negligence has inescapable overtones of 
moral disapproval, for it implies that there was a cheaper alternative to 
the accident . . . . Where, [alternatively,] the measures necessary to 
avert the accident would have consumed excessive resources, there is 
no occasion to condemn the defendant for not having taken them. 
Id. at 33. 
92. Jeff L. Lewin, Calabresi's Revenge? Junk Science in the Work of Peter Huber, 21 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 183, 193 (1992). 
93. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1 108-09 (1 972); see 
also MARK C. RAHDERT, COVERING ACCIDENT COSTS: INSURANCE, LIABILITY, AND TORT 
REFORM 29, 32-33 (1995) (analyzing rationale for insurance and addressing concern that 
cost-spreading function will divert compensatory responsibility away from least cost 
avoider). one frequently-referenced validation of the "least cost avoider" can be found in 
Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974), a California coastal oil spill case in 
which the court allowed commercial fishermen to recover from defendant their business 
losses caused by lost fishing opportunity during a period of pollution. Id. The court found 
justice and efficiency were sewed by placing responsibility for the loss on the "best cost 
avoider" (in this setting the defendant oil company), reasoning: "[Tlhe loss should be 
allocated to that party who can best correct any error in allocation, if such there be, by 
acquiring the activity to which the patty has been made liable . . . . The capacity "to buy 
out" the plaintiffs if the burden is too great is, in essence, the real focus of Calabresi's 
approach. On this basis there is no contest--the defendants' capacity is superior." Id. at 570. 
(citing Guido Calabresi, 'I& COST OF A c c m m :  A LEGAL AND ECONO& ANALYSIS, 50 - 
52 (1970)). Calabresi and Hirschoff provide a concise description of what the least cost 
avoider approach requires, both of private parties and of the government: 
The strict liability test we suggest does not require that a governmental 
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the so called alternativecare - indemnity damage shifting scenario, "we do 
not want both tortfeasors to take precautions; we want the lower cost 
accident avoider to do so."94 It is seen readily that a cheapest cost avoider 
leads us to the conclusion that the component parts supplier, or a raw 
materials supplier, is not ordinarily the entity that can most readily detect 
risks posed by a completed product, or reduce such risks to a reasonable 
level. 
2. Pareto Eficiency 
From another, yet still efficiency-influenced, perspective a 
products liability doctrine that passes efficiency muster probably would 
result also in a Pareto superior or even a Pareto optimal resolution?' A rule 
is Pareto optimal when its effects benefit all parties, in essence, a win-win 
prop~sit ion.~~ AS summarized by Mark Seidenfeld: "An economic change 
institution make . . . a cost-benefit analysis. It requires . . . only a 
decision as to which of the parties to the accident is in the best position 
to make a cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and accident 
avoidance costs and to act on the decision once it is made. The question 
for the court reduces to a search for the cheapest cost avoider. 
Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE 
L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972). 
94. POSNER, supra, note 81 at 189. In some settings defendants themselves have sought to 
employ the cheapest cost avoider rationale to promote a finding of no liability when a 
consumer aware of product risks is, the argument goes, the party that can most cheaply 
avoid the accident costs See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1254 
(N.J. 1990) (discussing defendant's argument that cigarette consumers are cheapest cost 
avoiders). 
95. The Pareto criteria for wealth maximization analysis are summarized in ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF TORT LAW which states: 
The first application of the Pareto criteria is to evaluate the desirability 
of changes in the distribution of goods. Pareto's system allows that 
evaluation without regard to the desirability of the initial distribution 
among individuals of either their abilities to pay or enjoy and without 
the need for interpersonal utility comparisons. Imagine a society in 
which all resources have already been allocated to particular ' 
individuals. Now imagine a change in allocations that left at least one 
person better off and no one worse off. Surely that change is desirable 
from any perspective. Economists refer to such a' change in the 
allocation of resources as a Pareto superior change. 
DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TORT LAW I1 (1 992). 
96. Id. at 12. Richard A. Posner further elaborated upon the principle by stating: 
Heinonline - -  26 N. Ky. L. Rev. 563 1999 
564 NORTHERNKENTUCKYLA W REVIEW [Vol. 26:3 
is considered a Pareto improvement [or Pareto superior] if it makes some 
individuals better off without making any person worse off. A state of the 
economic system is Pareto optimal [or Pareto efficient] if there is no 
Pareto superior state that society can reach. If we are using the Pareto 
criterion to evaluate our economic system, we say that a Pareto optimal 
state is "economically effi~ient."~' A liability rule that creates burdens 
upon one participant with no correlative benefits to other participants 
would be denominated Pareto inefficient. 
V. COMPONENT PART AND RAW MATERIAL SELLERS' 
DUTIES ANALYZED IN TERMS OF CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 
AND EFFICIENCY 
A. Corrective Justice-Morality 
With regard to warnings obligations particularly, the "informed 
consent" rationale reflects the societal judgment that a product user or 
consumer is entitled to make his own choice as to whether the product's 
utility or benefits justify exposing himself to the risk of harm.98 From the 
standpoint of corrective justice, warnings adequate to permit a product 
user to make an informed decision as to whether to expose himself or 
others to the risk are central to preservation of a product user's autonomy 
 interest^.^' From an efficiency perspective, informed decision making by a 
[Tlhe Pareto principle . . . is that a change (including a change brought 
about by an accident or an intentional act) is good if it makes at least 
one person better off and no one worse off. This is a 'liberal' principle 
akin to Kant's and Mill's principle that everyone is entitled to as much 
liberty as is consistent with the liberty of all other people. 
Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A Philosophical Inquity, in 
PH~LOSOPH~CAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 99,104 (David G. Owen ed., 1995). 
97. MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 49 (1996). 
For a general description of Pareto optimality principles, see ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW 
AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THEORY AND PRAC~CE (1 990). 
98. See, e.g., Bore1 v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973). The 
court stated that "a true choice situation arises, and a duty to warn attaches, whenever a 
reasonable man would want to be informed of the risk in order to decide whether to expose 
himself to it." Id. at 1089; Graham v. Wyeth Lab., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1498 (D. Kan. 1987) 
(holding that consumer has right to know risks so that he can make informed decision). 
99. Conversely, a risk creatofs interest in self autonomy diminishes to the extent that he 
has "already injected himself into the plaintiffs realm." Andrulonis v. United States, 724 F. 
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plaintiff permits the buyer-seller transaction to be fairly characterized as 
an agreement that avoids the extracontractual inefficiencies of involuntary 
wealth transfers.'"" 
In the context of hypothesized warnings that might be required of 
a seller of, to employ an earlier example, Teflon (TM), there is no 
practicable means for a seller to communicate cautionary information to 
the ultimate user or consumer. There is an accepted doctrine in the law of 
product warnings that permits a bulk seller to discharge its warning 
obligations by its provision to the immediate vendee, ordinarily the injured 
party's employer, sufficient safety related information to permit the vendee 
to provide adequate warnings to users.lO' This approach fails in the setting 
of raw materials and components parts sellers for this reason: The 
accepted doctrine is premised on the seller's ascertainment that the vendee 
is sufficiently sophisticated and responsible to convey such information to 
the users. This predicate is arguably workable when the product is 
establishedand its accepted use fairly well defined. An example might be 
an industrial solvent, and the risks to be communicated might logically 
focus on ventilation, inhalation, dermal exposure and flammability. For 
newer synthetic products, in contrast, the boundless and growing potential 
applications and misapplications, effectively preclude a seller's confident 
transmittal of safety information to its vendee. Due to the new and 
dynamic uses to which the raw material might be put, a seller might not 
yet know of either the potential risks or the capacity of the vendee to 
responsibly communicate them to either employees or consumers. 
A representativeexpression of the "informed consent" rationale of 
warnings analysis has been put this way: The duty to warn arises 
"whenever a reasonable man would want to be informed of the risk in 
order to decide whether to expose himselfto it."lo2 Thus, a core attribute of 
the Reporters' approach is one of vindicating the personal autonomy 
interest that underpins corrective justice. 
Supp. 1421, 1494 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting Shlomo Twerski, Note, AJirmative Duty Ajfer 
Tarasofi 1 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101 3, 1025 (1983)), modijed on other grounds, 924 F.2d 
1210 (2d Cir. 1991). 
100. Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 81 1,814 (6th Cir. 1982) (citing Borel 
v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973)). The Borel case 
stated that a product must not be made available to the public without disclosure of the 
dangers that the application of reasonable foresight would reveal. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1089. 
101. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PRODUCTS LIABILIIY 2 cmt. i (1 998). 
102. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1089. 
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With respect to warning obligations to intermediaries,no hardship 
is worked upon corrective justice principles by continuation of the nearly 
universal rule that a warning only to an intermediary will satisfy a seller's 
obligations when, in the totality of the circumstances, it can be predicted 
that pertinent safety-related information will be effectively conveyed to 
the end user.'03 In a scenario often involving risks of personal injury to 
workplace users of the product, the Third Restatement preserves the 
conventional rule regarding a seller's informational obligation to remote 
users by stating: "The standard is one of reasonableness in the 
circumstances. Among the factors to be considered are the gravity of the 
risks posed by the product, the likelihood that the intermediarywill convey 
the information to the ultimate user, and the feasibility and effectiveness 
of giving a warning directly to the user."lo4 This approach is in no 
material way unlike that' suggested by the earlier Second 'Restatement 
section 388, comment n and it is consistent with the protocol described in 
the leading case law. 
A like conclusion can be reached in claims arising from use of, or 
contact with, raw materials. In terms of corrective justice, the sellers of 
raw materials, many of which are transformed into a seemingly limitless 
array of applications by downstream participants in the commercial chain, 
have not, in any meaningful way, caused a plaintiffs harm. As a plaintiff 
may pursue a remedy against the distributive participant who did work the 
allegedly harmful change or modification in the material that triggered a 
warning obligation, the principles of corrective justice likewise are 
preserved. 
In the context of component part suppliers or the sellers of raw 
materials that will be transformed into a part of a multitude of products, 
the developed Hand formulation, supports the conclusion under the Third 
Restatement that neither warning nor design duties should ordinarily attach 
to the supplier. Apart from the rare instance in which the supplier knows 
specifically of, or has actually participated in the judgment to utilize the 
component part or raw material in an application that entails excess 
preventable risk, the supplier will not have the expertise to appreciate, and 
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY 4 2 cmt. i (1 998). 
104. Id. 
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as a practical matter has no means to accurately foresee, the uses to which 
the product will be put. The burden, therefore, of assuming this 
responsibility (acquisition of staff, micro-inquiries into the proposed uses 
to which vendees will put the product) will therefore be quite large. Even 
at its extremity such a burden could not be confidently discharged, as the 
potential incautious uses to which a component part or a raw material may 
be put are bordered only by the human imagination. Thus, definitionally 
the burden of such precautionary measures is potentially boundless, and 
therefore in most instances greater than the probability of a harm (again 
unquantifiable) times the magnitude of the loss should it occur (again 
unquantifiable). 
In the main, the Third Restatement's treatment of warnings can be 
harmonized readily with both Posner's market efficiency and Calabresi's 
least cost avoider approaches. By declining to take a position that suggests 
that a warning should be given even where the risk and the means of its 
avoidance are abundantly clear, the Reporters avoid adding unnecessary 
precautionarycosts to the marketingof products of utility by stating that: 
From a fairness perspective, requiring individual users 
and consumers to bear appropriate responsibility for 
proper product use prevents careless users and consumers 
from being subsidized by more careful users and 
consumers, when the former are paid damages out of 
funds to which the latter are forced to contribute through 
higher product prices.'05 
While phrased in terms of fairness, this assertion speaks with 
equal persuasiveness in terms of In addition, a sketch of 
105. Id. 4 2 cmt. a 
106. But see Howard A. Latin, Behavioral Criticisms of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability, 16 J .  PROD & TOXICS LIAB. 209,2 12 (1 994). Latin argues: 
[The Reporters suggest] that courts should avoid requiring warnings 
about "obvious product" risks. However, courts often disagree about 
which particular product hazards are obvious, and the Reporters offer 
no guidance on just how obvious a risk must be before courts should 
hold as a matter of law that warnings need not mention the risk. A 
hazard obvious to 80 percent of product users would not be evident to 
the other 20 percent, and the costs of providing a more complete 
warning to this minority group may be justified in comparison with the 
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Pareto efficient application to a component seller's warning duties readily 
reveals that warning duties create a cost to the seller, which will be passed 
along to vendees, with no commensurate benefit in terms of reducing 
avoidable accident costs. As it is the downstream formulator or fabricator 
that can most readily and inexpensively anticipate and ameliorate risk, 
placement of informationalobligations upon the vendee can be considered 
Pareto efficient, while application of warnings duties upon the component 
seller would be Pareto inefficient. 
Regarding the Third Restatement's approach to warnings to 
intermediaries and with respect to raw materials, the influence of 
efficiency considerations is even more apparent. In confirming that the 
objective of the Third Restatement § 2(c) comment i is indistinguishable 
from that of the Second Restatement section 388 comment n,"' the 
Reporters emphasize the Third Restatement's goal of lowering accident 
costs by recognizing that it is ordinarily the workplace supervisor who can 
most efficiently and effectively communicate risk information, particularly 
in settings involving bulk sales of potentially hazardous  material^.'^^ Thus, 
the Third Restatement promotes an efficient rule that would relieve the 
component or ingredient supplier of liability when the component or 
ingredient is not itself defective. In such circumstances, the component or 
ingredient supplier ordinarily has no meaningful control over the hazard 
level, if any, of the finished p rodu~ t . ' ~  As between the ingredient supplier 
accident losses that could be prevented. Once it is acknowledged that 
human cognitive capacities and receptivity to new information vary 
widely, which is amply demonstrated by the social science evidence, 
there is no reason to assume that a risk "obvious" to many product users 
will be equally "obvious" to others. 
Id. at 216. See also Howard A. Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and 
Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193 (1994) (setting forth considerable 
social science evidence supporting the above-stated assertion). 
107. Comment i of 8 2(c) of the Third Restatement and comment n of 8 388 of the Second 
Restatement both pertain to warning duties to third persons. 
108. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY 8 2(c) cmt. i, no. 5 
(1998) (Reporters' Note). 
109. Any substance can be hazardous. As the 16th century physician Paracelsus stated: 
"'What is not a poison? All things are poison and none without poison. Only the dose 
determines that a thing is not a poison."' Charles E. Erway, 111, The Ingredient Supplier 
Defense, 16 J .  PROD. & Toxlcs LIAB. 269, 273 & n.15 (1994) (quoting AMERICAN 
CONFERJWCE OF GOVERNMENTAL INDUS. HYGENISTS, THRESHOLD L m  VALUES- 
DISCUSSION AND THIRTY-FIVE YEAR INDEX WITH RECOMMENDAT~ONS 332 (1984)). 
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and the downstream assembler or formulator, the proper conclusion is that 
the downstream formulator, with its superior (and often exclusive) 
knowledge of the product's end use, and which is responsible for ultimate 
design, formulation, packaging, risk information and marketing, should 
remain the principal locus of potential liability."0 
The tort goal of deterrence. is in no way compromised by 
application of a "no duty" rule to mere suppliers of merchantable raw 
materials. A residual duty of reasonablenessexists in the supplier's duty to 
supply what has been ordered. If a standard grade of copper is ordered and 
what is supplied is contaminated or a different grade and an injury results, 
the raw material supplier should be subject to liability. Likewise, if a raw 
material supplier goes beyond its traditional role and actively participates 
in the manufacturingprocess, its conduct should be judged on the basis of 
a reasonableness standard. Both of the aforementioned duties provide the 
raw materials supplier with an incentive to conduct its business consistent 
with a standard of reasonableness,and to avoid harmful behavior. 
Deterrence only works if behavior exists that can be encouraged 
or prevented. Case law ranging from the most inchoate early rules to the 
most modern analyses have suggested that the manufacturer of the 
product, and not the raw material supplier, is in the best position to prevent 
110. Illuminating in this regard is SheN Oil Co. v. Harrison, 425 So. 2d 67, 70 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1982), a suit brought against the manufacturer of the chemical DBCP, which was 
sold to a formulator who used it as an ingredient of a fumigant claimed to have injured farm 
workers. Id. at 68. As the court stated: "[Llabeling and packaging requirements necessarily 
differ depending on the particular [end product] formulation and, thus, place the 
responsibility on the formulator for providing adequate warning to the public . . . ." Id. at 
70. Similarly, and illustrative of application of the least cost avoider approach, is 
Beauchamp v. Russell, 547 F. Supp. 1191 (N.D. Ga 1982), involving the issue of the 
connection, if any, between an air valve component in a pneumatically-run pelletizer and 
the injury of plaintiff's spouse. Id. at 1193. The court suggested that the duty to warn 
should properly be placed upon the participant in manufacture with the greatest access to 
information and the easiest means of its dissemination. Id. at 1197. In the,,words of the 
court: 
The responsibility for information collection and dissemination should 
rest on the party who has the greatest access to the information and who 
can make it available at the-lowest cost. Where a component part is 
incorporated into another product, without material change, the 
manufacturer of the part is in the best position to bear this 
responsibility." 
Id. 
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an accident or injury. First, the manufacturer is a knowledgeable 
purchaser, usually industrial, and is aware of the problems that a raw 
material can cause. Second, the manufacturer alone knows about its 
products, as well as who is likely to use them. The manufacturer is in the 
appropriate position to formulate warnings and to design its product so as 
to prevent injury. If it is impossible to prevent some risks, the Third 
Restatement requires manufacturers to warn about them, unless they 
involve hazards that everybody knows about. 
The TMJ cases are significant because they have made it clear that 
knowledge of how a raw material will be used does not, by itself, create a 
duty to investigatethe risks posed by the final product."' 
A Third Restatement "no duty" rule governing sales of 
merchantable component parts, raw materials, and ingredients, represents 
sound policy. If those who mined copper, lead, or fabricated steel were 
strictly liable for harms caused by end-use products, insurance would be 
either unavailable or enormously costly. Those saddled with the task of 
actuarially determining a proper rate would be faced with indeterminate 
liability because they would not know what products would eventually be 
made. Delineating a rational starting point for, or cessation of potential 
liability, would be impossible. By way of contrast, an insurer for the 
end-use product producer can look at, and evaluate, based on history and 
rational projections, insurance risks of end-use products. Information on 
liability costs, past and projected, is crucial to carriers seeking to make 
coverage decisions and to set premiums. This information is available to 
the manufacturer of the end product, while it is normally unavailable to the 
supplier of raw materials potentially suited to a large number of potential 
end uses. Thus, the raw materials manufacturer, if subject to potential 
liability for harms caused by products in which the material ultimately was 
an ingredient, could never procure liability insurance in an informed and 
cost effective way. In terms of efficiency, insurance becomes less 
expensive, and the raw materials supplier and the end use manufacturer 
avoid duplicating insurance coverage. 
11 1. See, e.g., In re TMJ Implants Products Liability Litigation, 97 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 
1996). 
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CONCLUSION 
Liability issues pertaining to component part, raw material and 
ingredient suppliers are both longstanding and pervasive in the purchase 
and sale of products. These questions concerned transactions ranging 
from the sale of behemoth turbines for ocean-going vessels in East River 
Steamship Corp. v. ~ransamerica Delaval,"* where the Supreme Court 
applied the economic loss doctrine, and the Supreme Court observed that 
virtually every product has  component^,"^ to the more prosaic, for 
example, fiber binding tape that a hypothetical business, "Boxes Are Us", 
might use to secure cardboard boxes used in shipping countless types of 
items.lI4 The longstanding nature of these questions was highlighted 
recently in a newspaper article I read that speculated that the reason the 
iceberg damaged the Titanic so mortally was because the rivets employed 
to bind together the hull plates had a level of internal metallurgical 
imperfections far exceeding what would be expected even in that era. 
To borrow from Max Weber, Restatements float or sink on the 
moving stream of judicial acceptance. The rules expressed in the Third 
Restatement will either be validated as a material contribution to the 
rationalization of this field by a swell of favorable references in judicial 
opinions, or it will atrophy. Some, such as Guido Calabrese, have 
suggested that the Third Restatement will not be successful. With 
temerity, I think the great Yale scholar, and now federal judge, is in error. 
As suggested earlier, no new treatment of products liability will overrun 
judicial and statutory thinking as did the Second Restatement Section 
402A. But in its introductory commentary, the ALI recognizes that habit 
and acculturation may militate against abandonment of the classical 
doctrinal labels, such as strict tort liability or negligence."' Even when 
that proves true, the Third Restatement Reporters and the ALI agree, the 
venerable doctrinal categories can coexist with the functional definitions 
of manufacturing defects, design defects and warning/instructionsdefects. 
And, when used as a means of evaluating products liability claims, 
whether bonded with a doctrinal title or standing alone, the Third 
112.476 U.S. 858 (1986). 
113. Id. at 867. 
1 14. Such tape, we might imagine, would besuitable for securing boxes containing quilts, 
but a broken foot waiting to happen if used to secure a cast iron anvil. 
1 15. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY I N T R O D U ~ O N  (1998). 
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Restatement, including its provisions for sellers of component parts, raw 
materials and product ingredients, represents a work product satisfying the 
highest and best purposes of the American Law Institute. 
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